Efficient Allocations in Club Economies

Marcus Berliant and John Edwards ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 6, issue 1, 43-63

Abstract: We explore the characteristics of Pareto‐optimal allocations in the context of local public goods or clubs. A set of first‐order conditions for Pareto optimality is provided. Classical treatments apparently neglect an important term related to migrant compensation, and thus are incorrect. A Pareto optimum is shown to exist.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00156.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:43-63

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