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Economic Diplomacy

Clara Ponsati ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 6, issue 5, 675-691

Abstract: We study bilateral conflicts that affect the welfare of third parties, the stakeholders. The conflict takes the form of a war of attrition and intervention is modeled as the possibility that the stakeholder "aids" the agreement with transfers to the contenders. We characterize the optimal policy when the stakeholder limits its intervention to a unilateral commitment to compensate the contenders if the conflict is resolved, and show that if contenders must be treated equally after agreement, then the optimal policy cannot eliminate the delay in resolving the conflict, and intervention is only advisable when the stakes are high enough. Economic diplomacy is modeled as a three-player game where the stakeholder is actively involved in the negotiation where transfers are discussed simultaneously with a settlement for the conflict. We prove that, provided that none of the parties involved is too impatient, diplomacy benefits the third party in all conflicts. Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Date: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:6:y:2004:i:5:p:675-691