Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods
Kurtis Swope () and
Eckhard Janeba ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 7, issue 3, 405-426
This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide, using majority rule, the provision level and financing instrument. The decisive voter has median preferences in a tax regime, but generally has above median preferences in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left‐skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high‐ and low‐preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right skewed. Public good provision and welfare under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:3:p:405-426
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().