Public Goods Provision: On Generalizing the Jackson–Moulin Mechanism
Yan Yu ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 1, 49-60
Abstract:
Jackson and Moulin (1992) proposed a simple mechanism to implement a wide class of cost‐sharing rules for the provision of a binary public good. Bag (1997) generalized this mechanism to divisible public goods under the assumption of “constant marginal benefit.” This paper generalizes the Jackson–Moulin mechanism to a broader setting, including the cases of both decreasing and constant marginal benefit. Moreover, this paper shows the impossibility of generalizing the mechanism further.
Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00252.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:1:p:49-60
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