On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules

Juan D. Moreno‐ternero and Antonio Villar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 2, 283-291

Abstract: A taxation problem consists of collecting a given amount of taxes out of a population whose gross income vector is given. A tax rule R is more equitable than a rule R′ when the after‐tax income vector generated by R Lorenz dominates that generated by R′. In this paper, we present a one‐parameter family of tax rules whose members are fully ranked in terms of relative equitability, for any (finite) income distribution.

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: On the relative equitability of a family of taxation rules (2006)
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