An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods

Fan-chin Kung

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 3, 345-355

Abstract: We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a well‐defined solution that selects envy‐free allocations from the core.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00267.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:345-355

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