The Strategic Use of Scandals

Gilles Grolleau (), Alain Marciano and Naoufel Mzoughi

Kyklos, 2020, vol. 73, issue 4, 524-542

Abstract: Scandals are pervasive in many areas of society. We propose a characterization of scandals that explicitly considers their potential benefits to transgressors. Although scandals are frequently considered to be undesirable to the targets or transgressors implicated, we develop four rationales by which a scandal can actually be beneficial to them. First, a scandal can propel an individual, organization or cause into the limelight and generate low‐cost publicity that can serve the target’s interest, e.g., by increasing the visibility and salience of a particular issue or providing them a platform to spin the scandal with the megaphone of mass media coverage. Second, a scandal target can choose to play the role of altruistic or self‐seeking scapegoat. Third, a scandal target can use a scandal as a smokescreen to divert attention from other more serious issues. Fourth, a scandal can serve as a way to disadvantage competitors or rivals. For each rationale, we suggest some conditions of its success. Anecdotal evidence and real‐world examples are also provided to illustrate and support these rationales.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12249

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:73:y:2020:i:4:p:524-542

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Access Statistics for this article

Kyklos is currently edited by Rene L. Frey

More articles in Kyklos from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().