Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective
Roger Congleton
Kyklos, 2024, vol. 77, issue 1, 3-21
Abstract:
This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function.
Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12356
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:77:y:2024:i:1:p:3-21
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