Details about Roger D. Congleton

Homepage:	http://rdc1.net
Workplace:	Economics Department, George Mason University, (more information at EDIRC) Department of Economics, College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, (more information at EDIRC) Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC), Economics Department, George Mason University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Roger D. Congleton.

Last updated 2025-01-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pco300

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Working Papers

2018

1. A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University
   See also Journal Article A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors, Economics of Governance, Springer (2019) View citations (3) (2019)
2. Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University View citations (1)

2015

3. Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University
4. On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University
5. On the Political Economy of Privacy: Information Sharing between Friends and Foes
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University
6. The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University View citations (10)
   See also Journal Article The Logic of Collective Action and beyond, Public Choice, Springer (2015) View citations (10) (2015)

2014

7. A Test of the Unraveling Hypothesis: Constitutional Bargaining and the Quality of African Institutions
   CEI Working Paper Series, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University View citations (2)

2013

8. On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University View citations (5)
   See also Journal Article On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers, Constitutional Political Economy, Springer (2013) View citations (5) (2013)
9. The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan, Constitutional Political Economy, Springer (2014) View citations (8) (2014)

2011

10. Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?
    CIW Discussion Papers, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW)

2010

11. On the Evolution of Organizational Government
    Papers on Economics and Evolution, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography

2007

12. Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform
    Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

1995

13. Return to Rio: Agency problems and the political economy of environmental treaties
    Discussion Papers, Series II, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy" View citations (1)

Journal Articles

2024

1. Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective
   Kyklos, 2024, 77, (1), 3-21

2023

2. Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life
   Public Choice, 2023, 195, (1), 73-100 View citations (4)
3. Grounding multidisciplinary public policy analysis in methodological individualism: with an illustrating study of the economic and political effects of variations in a nation’s average work ethic
   International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, 2023, 17, (2), 351-383 View citations (1)

2022

4. Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities
   Public Choice, 2022, 191, (3), 387-404
5. Readership and citations as alternative measures of impact
   Constitutional Political Economy, 2022, 33, (1), 100-114 View citations (2)

2020

6. Ethics and good governance
   Public Choice, 2020, 184, (3), 379-398 View citations (3)
7. Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism
   Constitutional Political Economy, 2020, 31, (1), 111-141 View citations (7)
8. On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels
   Public Choice, 2020, 183, (1), 101-132 View citations (2)
9. The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory
   European Journal of Political Economy, 2020, 63, (C) View citations (4)

2019

10. A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors
    Economics of Governance, 2019, 20, (2), 103-128 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors, Working Papers (2018) (2018)
11. Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective
    Public Policy Review, 2019, 15, (2), 175-198 View citations (1)
12. On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
    Public Choice, 2019, 181, (1), 5-12 View citations (3)

2018

13. A short history of constitutional liberalism in America
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, 29, (2), 137-170
14. Constitutional bargaining and the quality of contemporary African institutions: a test of the incremental reform hypothesis
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2018, 14, (2), 233-258 View citations (1)
15. Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees
    Public Choice, 2018, 175, (3), 229-244 View citations (7)
16. On the codetermination of tax-financed medical R&D and healthcare expenditures: Models and evidence
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 54, (C), 175-188 View citations (5)

2017

17. Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics
    Public Choice, 2017, 171, (1), 23-28
18. The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems
    Kyklos, 2017, 70, (4), 483-510 View citations (7)

2016

19. Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, 27, (2), 179-193

2015

20. Thanks to Gordon Tullock
    Public Choice, 2015, 162, (3), 229-233
21. The Logic of Collective Action and beyond
    Public Choice, 2015, 164, (3), 217-234 View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond, Working Papers (2015) View citations (10) (2015)

2014

22. The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2014, 25, (1), 39-67 View citations (8)
    See also Working Paper The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan, Working Papers (2013) View citations (3) (2013)

2013

23. Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, 24, (2), 108-124 View citations (25)
24. On the editorial transition
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, 24, (1), 1-1
25. On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, 24, (3), 177-198 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers, Working Papers (2013) View citations (5) (2013)

2012

26. Growing up with The Calculus of Consent
    Public Choice, 2012, 152, (3), 273-278 View citations (1)
27. On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts
    Public Choice, 2012, 150, (3), 399-423 View citations (5)
28. The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock
    Public Choice, 2012, 152, (1), 131-146 View citations (4)

2011

29. Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance
    Public Choice, 2011, 149, (1), 187-207 View citations (9)

2010

30. Dennis C. Mueller: Reason, religion, and liberal democracy
    Public Choice, 2010, 145, (3), 585-587
31. The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence
    Public Choice, 2010, 144, (3), 535-555 View citations (22)
32. Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?”
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2010, 23, (1), 103-105

2009

33. Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2009, 25, (1), 102-114 View citations (14)
34. On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009
    Public Choice, 2009, 140, (3), 287-317 View citations (20)

2008

35. America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2008, 19, (1), 35-59 View citations (3)

2007

36. Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 509-511 View citations (4)
37. From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 23, (2), 261-284 View citations (44)
38. Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 333-352 View citations (36)
39. Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice
    Public Choice, 2007, 133, (3), 499-501
40. On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, 18, (3), 145-159 View citations (7)

2006

41. International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations
    The Review of International Organizations, 2006, 1, (4), 319-336 View citations (2)
42. The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe
    Public Choice, 2006, 127, (1), 5-30 View citations (38)

2004

43. Economic Development and Democracy. Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage?
    Homo Oeconomicus, 2004, 21, 283-314 View citations (14)
44. Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association
    Rivista di Politica Economica, 2004, 94, (4), 49-78 View citations (3)
45. The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock
    Public Choice, 2004, 121, (1), 213-238 View citations (20)

2003

46. A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2003, 14, (3), 167-190 View citations (23)

2002

47. Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence
    Public Finance Review, 2002, 30, (5), 456-476 View citations (1)
48. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper)
    Managerial and Decision Economics, 2002, 23, (3), 145-147

2001

49. Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2001, 44, (2), 145-167 View citations (13)
50. In Defense of Ignorance: On the Significance of a Neglected Form of Incomplete Information
    Eastern Economic Journal, 2001, 27, (4), 391-407
51. On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2001, 12, (3), 193-215 View citations (20)
52. Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion
    Public Choice, 2001, 107, (1), 35-64 View citations (34)
    Also in Public Choice, 2001, 107, (1-2), 35-64 (2001) View citations (35)

1999

53. The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1999, 15, (2), 193-205 View citations (7)

1998

54. Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election
    Public Choice, 1998, 95, (3-4), 287-305 View citations (2)

1997

55. Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law
    Kyklos, 1997, 50, (4), 485-505 View citations (6)

1996

56. On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996, 30, (1), 133-136 View citations (1)

1995

57. On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models
    Public Choice, 1995, 84, (1-2), 1-24 View citations (31)

1994

58. The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators
    Public Choice, 1994, 79, (1-2), 47-60 View citations (16)

1992

59. Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil
    Public Choice, 1992, 73, (1), 1-19 View citations (4)
60. Political Institutions and Pollution Control
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1992, 74, (3), 412-21 View citations (197)
61. Rationality, Morality, and Exit
    American Political Science Review, 1992, 86, (2), 418-431 View citations (42)

1991

62. Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society
    Journal of Public Economics, 1991, 44, (1), 65-86 View citations (22)
    See also Chapter Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society, Springer Books, 1991, 769-790 (1991) (1991)
63. Information, Special Interests, and Single-Issue Voting
    Public Choice, 1991, 69, (1), 39-49 View citations (4)
64. The economic role of a work ethic
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1991, 15, (3), 365-385 View citations (10)

1990

65. The Growth of Social Security: Electoral Push or Political Pull?
    Economic Inquiry, 1990, 28, (1), 109-32 View citations (35)

1989

66. Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy
    Public Choice, 1989, 62, (2), 101-118 View citations (12)
67. Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989, 11, (2), 175-190 View citations (51)
    See also Chapter Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games, Springer Books, 1989, 697-712 (1989) (1989)
68. Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 1989, 22, (3), 662-72 View citations (2)
    See also Chapter Monitoring rent-seeking managers: advantages of diffuse ownership, Springer Books, 2008, 667-677 (2008) (2008)

1988

69. An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan
    Public Finance Review, 1988, 16, (2), 131-157 View citations (4)
70. Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?
    Public Choice, 1988, 56, (2), 181-184 View citations (9)

1986

71. Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising
    Public Choice, 1986, 49, (3), 249-263 View citations (28)
    See also Chapter Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising, Springer Books, 1986, 297-311 (1986) View citations (3) (1986)

1984

72. Committees and rent-seeking effort
    Journal of Public Economics, 1984, 25, (1-2), 197-209 View citations (38)
    See also Chapter Commitees and rent-seeking effort, Springer Books, 1984, 279-291 (1984) (1984)

1983

73. Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions
    Public Choice, 1983, 41, (3), 441-448 View citations (1)

1982

74. A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias
    Public Choice, 1982, 39, (3), 421-425 View citations (4)
75. Economic Conditions and National Elections, Post-Sample Forecasts of the Kramer Equations
    American Political Science Review, 1982, 76, (4), 873-875 View citations (4)

1979

76. Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments
    Public Choice, 1979, 34, (2), 217-230 View citations (4)

Books

2011

1. Perfecting Parliament
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (14)
   Also in Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press (2011) View citations (14)

2006

2. Politics by Principle, Not Interest
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (8)
   Also in Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press (1998) View citations (121)

Edited books

2015

1. Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
   Books, Edward Elgar Publishing View citations (172)

2008

2. 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1
   Springer Books, Springer
3. 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2
   Springer Books, Springer

2006

4. Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (56)

1995

5. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING
   Books, Edward Elgar Publishing View citations (27)

Chapters

2023

1. Federalism and tax-financed healthcare: economic advantages, dilemmas, and solutions
   Chapter 5 in Handbook on the Political Economy of Health Systems, 2023, pp 57-69

2013

2. Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812
   Chapter 4 in Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, 2013, pp 47-67
3. On Some Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock
   Springer View citations (2)
4. Public choice and the modern welfare state
   Chapter 22 in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, 2013, pp 362-381 View citations (7)

2008

5. Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions
   Springer
6. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview
   Springer
   Also in Springer (2008)
7. Monitoring rent-seeking managers: advantages of diffuse ownership
   Springer
   See also Journal Article Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership, Canadian Economics Association (1989) View citations (2) (1989)

2007

8. Informational Limits to Public Policy: Ignorance and the Jury Theorem
   Chapter 12 in Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, 2007

2006

9. Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization
   Chapter 5 in Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, 2006 View citations (4)

2004

10. The Political Economy of Crisis Management: Surprise, Urgency, and Mistakes in Political Decision Making
    A chapter in The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, 2004, pp 183-203

2001

11. The politics of government growth
    Chapter 22 in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2001

1991

12. Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society
    Springer
    See also Journal Article Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society, Elsevier (1991) View citations (22) (1991)

1989

13. Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games
    Springer
    See also Journal Article Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games, Elsevier (1989) View citations (51) (1989)

1986

14. Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising
    Springer View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising, Springer (1986) View citations (28) (1986)

1984

15. Commitees and rent-seeking effort
    Springer
    See also Journal Article Committees and rent-seeking effort, Elsevier (1984) View citations (38) (1984)

Editor

1. Constitutional Political Economy
   Springer