On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels

Roger Congleton, Youngshin Kim and Alexander Marsella
Additional contact information
Youngshin Kim: Keimyung University
Alexander Marsella: West Virginia University

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 183, issue 1, No 6, 132 pages

Abstract: Abstract An important issue associated with empirical research is the extent to which statistical results continue to hold in the post-sample period. Although many tests of robustness within the period of a given study are routinely reported, relatively little attention is paid to model performance in the post-sample period. This paper examines the post-sample performance of the Congleton and Shughart (Econ Inq 28(1): 109–132, 1990) estimates of three public choice models of Social Security benefit levels. The Social Security program is the single largest line item in the federal budget; so, examining the post-sample performance of the Congleton–Shughart estimates also sheds light on the long-run stability of political processes in the United States. In general, we find that the three public choice models perform well in the post-sample period, although there are several caveats to that conclusion. The results of our post-sample study also suggest that the political processes of the United States with respect to major fiscal policies are more stable and robust than news reports suggest.

Keywords: Social Security; Fiscal policy; Post-sample forecasts; Replication study; Public choice models; Political stability; U.S. politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-019-00689-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00689-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00689-1

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().