40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1

Congleton, Roger; Hillman, Arye L.; Konrad, Kai

40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1

Edited by Roger Congleton, Arye L. Hillman () and Kai Konrad

in Springer Books from Springer

Date: 2008
ISBN: 978-3-540-79182-9
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Chapters in this book:

Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview: Roger Congleton, Arye L. Hillman and Kai Konrad
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft: Gordon Tullock
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking: James Buchanan
Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions: Roger Congleton
Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and The Social Cost of Monopoly Power: Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz
Efficient Rent Seeking: Gordon Tullock
Free entry and efficient rent seeking: Richard S. Higgins, William F. Shughart and Robert Tollison
A general analysis of rent-seeking games: David Perez-Castrillo and Thierry Verdier
Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Kofi O. Nti
Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders: Aryel. Hillman and Dov Samet
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers: Arye L. Hillman and John G. Riley
The all-pay auction with complete information: Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper G. Vries
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction: Simon Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles Holt
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success: Jack Hirshleifer
Contest success functions: Stergios Skaperdas
On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games: Ferenc Szidarovszky and Koji Okuguchi
Commitees and rent-seeking effort: Roger Congleton
Risk-averse rent seeking with shared rents: Neil Vousden and Ngo Long
Collective Rent Dissipation: Shmuel Nitzan
The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups: Kyung Baik, Bouwe R. Dijkstra, Sanghack Lee and Shi Young Lee
Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition: Heinrich Ursprung
Effort levels in contests: Kyung Baik
Rent Seeking and The Provision of Public Goods: Mark Gradstein
A general model of rent seeking for public goods: Khalid Riaz, Jason Shogren and Stanley R. Johnson
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox: Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray
Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking: Elie Appelbaum and Eliakim Katz
Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly: Tore Ellingsen
Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests: Kai Konrad
Strategic restraint in contests: Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan
Strategic Behavior in Contests: Avinash Dixit
Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment: Kyung Baik and Jason Shogren
The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Victories are Potentially Transient and Losses Final: Joerg Stephan and Heinrich Ursprung
Uncertain preassigned non-contestable and contestable rents: Nava Kahana and Shmuel Nitzan
Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation: B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger and Alex Possajennikov
Information in conflicts: Karl W Ärneryd
Rent seeking with private values: David A. Malueg and Andrew Yates
Hierarchical Structure and The Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers: Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz
Group competition for rents: Eliakim Katz and Julia Tokatlidu
Bidding in hierarchies: Kai Konrad
Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking: Elie Appelbaum and Eliakim Katz
Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests: Mark Gradstein and Kai Konrad
Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations: Kofi O. Nti
Optimal Contests: Amihai Glazer and Refael Hassin
Competition over More Than One Prize: Derek J. Clark and Christian Rus
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests: Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela
Incentive effects of second prizes: Stefan Szymanski and Tommaso M. Valletti
Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets: Jason Shogren and Kyung Baik
An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking: Jan Potters, Casper G. Vries and Frans Winden
Efficient rent-seeking in experiment: Carsten Vogt, Joachim Weimann and Chun-Lei Yang

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9

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