Hierarchical Structure and The Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz
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Arye L. Hillman: Bar-Ilan University
Eliakim Katz: Bar-Ilan University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1987, pp 523-536 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The rent-seeking literature emphasizes that there are real costs associated with contestable transfers, via the real resources employed in contesting an artificially contrived rent or revenue. These real costs are then an addition to the Harberger efficiency costs of resource misallocation which arise because of government regulation or protection.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_37

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_37

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