Strategic Behavior in Contests

Avinash Dixit

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2008, pp 431-438 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers the effect of precommitment in contests where the rivals expend effort to win a prize. With two asymmetric players, it is found that the favorite will commit effort at a higher level than that in a Nash equilibrium without commitment, and the underdog at a lower level. With many players, the absence of an odds-on favorite among rivals is sufficient to ensure overcommitment by any one player. Applications to sports, oligopoly, and rent seeking are discussed.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Strategic Behavior in Contests (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_30

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_30

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