Effort levels in contests

Kyung Baik

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2008, pp 347-351 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We examine the equilibrium individual players’, groups, and total effort levels expended in a contest where groups compete with one another to win a group-specific public-good prize and the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_22

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_22

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