Efficient rent-seeking in experiment

Carsten Vogt, Joachim Weimann () and Chun-Lei Yang
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Carsten Vogt: Otto-von-Guericke Universit ät Magdeburg
Joachim Weimann: Otto-von-Guericke Universit ät Magdeburg
Chun-Lei Yang: Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy Academia Sinica

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2002, pp 681-692 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In a series of experiments we show that people learn to play the efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. This result persists despite quite different experiment environments and designs, like different propensities of competition, group sizes etc., and is interprtable as a resolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states that real-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than what the standard rent-seeking model predicts.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_49

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_49

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