Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders

Aryel. Hillman and Dov Samet
Additional contact information
Aryel. Hillman: Bar-Ilan University
Dov Samet: Bar-Ilan University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1987, pp 165-184 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of (1967) — or to use (1982) proposed term, the theory of directly unproductive profit-seeking activities — is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to capture and defend artificially-contrived rents and transfers. The scope for social loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the contest to determine the beneficiary of the prize. Underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540791829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().