Information in conflicts

Karl W Ärneryd ()
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Karl W Ärneryd: Stockholm School of Economics

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2003, pp 487-502 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider two-player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings where one player knows the value of the prize, while the other only knows its prior distribution, we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. In the special case of a lottery contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed.

Keywords: Conflict; Contest; Asymmetric information; All-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_35

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_35

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