Information in Conflicts

Karl Wärneryd

No 388, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of the prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000-06-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-ind
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, pages 121-136.

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Journal Article: Information in conflicts (2003)
Working Paper: Information in conflicts (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0388

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