Information in conflicts

Information in Konflikten

Karl Wärneryd

No FS IV 01-11, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in equilibrium if one party is privately informed about the value of a prize than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Furthermore, the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent.

Keywords: Conflict; contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information in conflicts (2003)
Working Paper: Information in Conflicts (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0111

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