Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests

Kai Konrad

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2000, pp 409-419 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant ’s own performance (standard rent seeking), and effort that reduces particular rivals ’ performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a “small number” phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_28

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