Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests

Kai Konrad

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, vol. 16, issue 1, 155-65

Abstract: This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking), and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a "small number" phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2000
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