A general model of rent seeking for public goods

Khalid Riaz, Jason Shogren and Stanley R. Johnson
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Khalid Riaz: Iowa State University
Stanley R. Johnson: Iowa State University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1995, pp 361-377 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper generalizes the model of collective rent-seeking over a public good. Expanding the rent seeker ’s consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good, our results suggest collective rent-seeking is positively related to group size. Although free riding exists within a group, there is not a one-for-one tradeoff. In addition, rent seeking increases with wealth. Finally, total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size, except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest. The key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good.

Date: 1995
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Related works:
Journal Article: A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods (1995)
Working Paper: A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods (1995)
Working Paper: A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_24

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_24

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