Group competition for rents

Eliakim Katz and Julia Tokatlidu
Additional contact information
Eliakim Katz: York University
Julia Tokatlidu: York University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1996, pp 537-545 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines rent dissipation in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest without a predetermined distribution rule, the rent in this setting exhibits both public and private good characteristics depending on the stage of the contest. Focusing on the relationship between group size and aggregate rent seeking we find that social waste depends not only on total numbers but also on the distribution of population across groups. We show that group size asymmetry acts to reduce rent dissipation.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Two-stage contests; Collective rent seeking; Group rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_38

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540791829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_38

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().