Bidding in hierarchies

Kai Konrad

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2004, pp 547-554 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on interand intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.

Keywords: Contest; Hierarchies; Rent dissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_39

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