Bidding in hierarchies

Das Bieten in Hierarchien

Kai Konrad

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.

Keywords: Contest; hierarchies; rent dissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Chapter: Bidding in hierarchies (2004)
Journal Article: Bidding in hierarchies (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200327

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