Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation

Burkhard Hehenkamp, W. Leininger () and Alex Possajennikov ()
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W. Leininger: University of Dortmund

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2003, pp 473-485 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Tullock’ s analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.

Keywords: Contests; Evolutionary stable strategy; Spite; Overdissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Journal Article: Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation (2004)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_34

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_34

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