Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation
Burkhard Hehenkamp (),
Wolfgang Leininger and
Alex Possajennikov ()
Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics
Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionary stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.
Pages: 18 pages
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Journal Article: Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mik:wpaper:03_01
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