The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups

Kyung Baik, Bouwe R. Dijkstra, Sanghack Lee and Shi Young Lee
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Bouwe R. Dijkstra: University of Nottingham
Shi Young Lee: Chung Ang University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2005, pp 323-328 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In competitive-share groups, groups of players compete for a rent and members of the winning group share the prize according to a weighted average of relative outlay and egalitarian shares. In strategic groups, group members compete individually for a rent and the winner keeps a part of the rent, and divides the rest among group members. In this note, we show that these two portrayals of rent seeking with groups are equivalent.

Keywords: Rent-seeking contest; Competitive-share group; Strategic group; Equivalence in rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Journal Article: The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_20

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_20

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