Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets

Jason Shogren and Kyung Baik

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2008, pp 651-661 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Given Millner and Pratt’ s (1989) finding of behavior inconsistent with theory, we reexamine efficient rent-seeking in experimental markets. We show that (a) when r = 3, no Nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency, and (b) when r = 1, with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix, rentseeking behavior is consistent with both Nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Reexamining Efficient Rent-Seeking in Laboratory Markets (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_47

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_47

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