On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs

Roger Congleton

Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, vol. 18, issue 3, 145-159

Keywords: Social Insurance; Agency Problems; Exit; Averse Selection; Welfare State; Social Security; Public Choice; Constitutional Economics; Liberalism; H4; D6; P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9018-0

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