On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs
Roger Congleton ()
Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, vol. 18, issue 3, 145-159
Keywords: Social Insurance; Agency Problems; Exit; Averse Selection; Welfare State; Social Security; Public Choice; Constitutional Economics; Liberalism; H4; D6; P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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