A Test of the Unraveling Hypothesis: Constitutional Bargaining and the Quality of African Institutions

Roger Congleton and Dongwoo Yoo

No 2014-4, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper focuses on the source of path dependency in institutions. Within a bargaining theory of reform, the domain of bargaining and number of bargains reached determine the path of institutional change. The French and British governments negotiated with their various African independence movements during the 1950s, and produced a relatively large number of relatively liberal independence constitutions. After independence, a series of political and military shocks created natural moments for constitutional reform that unraveled the relatively high-quality political and legal institutions agreed to in the years leading to ndependence, although some unraveled more than others. The African countries that began with the narrowest domain of constitutional bargaining and experienced the fewest political shocks generally have better contemporary institutions than states that began with less restrictive constitutional rules and experienced more constitutional moments.

Keywords: Decolonization; Independence; Constitutional Negotiations; Constitutional Bargaining; Post-Colonial Reform; Eminent Domain; Takings; Institutions; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 N47 O43 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-gro
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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