Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Roger Congleton

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 132, issue 3, 333-352

Keywords: Jury theorem; Rational ignorance; Elections; Delegation; Expert’s dilemma; Information aggregation; Yardstick competition; Informational policies; Liberal institutions; Effectiveness of democracy; Majority rule; Simulated elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9155-z

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