Political Institutions and Pollution Control

Roger Congleton

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1992, vol. 74, issue 3, 412-21

Abstract: This paper models the selection of environmental policies under authoritarian and democratic regimes, and tests the hypothesis that political institutions systematically affect the enactment of environmental regulations. The results support the contention that political institutional arrangements, rather than resource endowments, largely determine policies concerning environmental regulation. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Date: 1992
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