On the Evolution of Organizational Government

Roger Congleton

Papers on Economics and Evolution from Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography

Abstract: This paper analyzes the design, refinement, and evolution of organizational policymaking processes, that is to say, organizational governance. Governance procedures like other aspects of organization are refined through time to advance formeteur interests. Several mechanisms of evolution are explored in this paper. First, formal organizations have a beginning. They are founded. As a consequence, governance templates initially tend to maximize formeteur control over their organizations. Second, formeteurs may subsequently revise the initial distribution of authority. There are often good reasons for formeteurs to exchange some of their initial authority for services and resources that advance organizational interests. Third, there are the constraints of survivorship, which require an organization to attract sufficient resources to be self sustaining. This paper suggests that the results of these processes of refinement tend to be rule-driven, divided governments, many of which will be based on the king and council template. That template facilitates the emergence of relatively effective forms of organizational governance, because it can be adjusted at a large number of margins without changing the essential architecture of governance.

Keywords: Length; 37; pages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-ore
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