Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Roger Congleton

Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, vol. 27, issue 2, No 6, 179-193

Abstract: Abstract Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.

Keywords: Gordon Tullock; Coercion; Conflict; Law; Authoritarian; Constitutional political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B2 H1 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9213-y

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