On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run

Roger Congleton

No 15-25, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the formation, refinement, and evolution of organizational decisionmaking processes, e.g. organizational governments. In doing so, it develops a framework for analyzing a broad cross section of private and non-private formal organizations. Formal organizations are all founded, e.g. they have a beginning. As a consequence, decisionmaking authority within an organization is often initially distributed in a manner that provides their founders (formeteurs) with substantial control over their organizations. However, that control is rarely, if ever, complete, because formeteurs have interests that can often be advanced by trading and/or delegating authority to others in exchange for services and other resources that increase organizational surplus. The result tends to be divided, rule-based, governance based on the king and council template.

Keywords: organizational governance; divided governance; decisionmaking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2015-01
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