Intergenerational Transfers, and Public Pensions in a Non Altuistic Setting: a Public Choice Model

Furio Rosati

LABOUR, 2001, vol. 15, issue 1, 81-109

Abstract: The paper presents a model based on non‐altruistic individuals, where middle aged and old individuals influence the decisions about public social security system. This is an alternative or a complement to private intergenerational transfers. Fertility is endogenous, as children are seen as an assets in the process of transferring resources to old age by the network of intergenerational intrafamily transfers. Expectations about the Government social security budget balance play a crucial role. We also present some empirical estimates of the fertility and pension ‘demand’ function for some developed countries. It emerges that both can be treated as endogenous, and the results are coherent with the theory.

Date: 2001
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