Employment‐protecting Labour Market Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct Investments
Minas Vlassis ()
LABOUR, 2009, vol. 23, issue 4, 677-696
Abstract. This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export‐substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) — in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union‐oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI‐associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment‐neutral (‐enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of — intermediate — FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment‐reducing inward FDI.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:labour:v:23:y:2009:i:4:p:677-696
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