Economies of Scale and Scope, Contestability, Windfall Profits and Regulatory Risk

Michael J. Ryan

Manchester School, 2000, vol. 68, issue 6, 701-722

Abstract: In this paper I introduce new results on economies of scale and scope and develop implications of these results for contestability and regulation. This is done using a goal programming approach which endogenizes regulatory frameworks in a multiperiod and multiregion monopolistic and oligopolistic analysis. This explicitly spatial approach leads to useful distinctions between industrial contestability and market contestability and a multiperiod contestability‐based regulatory model. That model is then extended to a state preference framework with regulatory risk and windfall gains and losses.

Date: 2000
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