Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization

Francis Bloch

Manchester School, 2002, vol. 70, issue 1, 36-55

Abstract: This paper provides a selective survey of recent approaches to coalition and network formation in industrial organization, and offers a unified framework in which the different approaches can be compared. We focus on two extreme forms of cooperation—collusive agreements and cost‐reducing alliances. We show that bilateral negotiations yield higher levels of cooperation than multilateral agreements, that the formation of a cartel depends on the sequentiality of the procedure of coalition formation, and that the size of alliances depends on the membership rule.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00282

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:70:y:2002:i:1:p:36-55

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().