On the Effectiveness of the Lifetime–Employment–Contract Policy

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Manchester School, 2002, vol. 70, issue 6, 812-821

Abstract: This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime–employment–contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two–stage quantity–setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective.

Date: 2002
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