Imperfect transparency and the strategic use of information: an ever present temptation for central bankers?
Andrew Hughes Hallett () and
Nicola Viegi ()
Manchester School, 2003, vol. 71, issue 5, 498-520
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2003&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:71:y:2003:i:5:p:498-520
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786
Access Statistics for this article
Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn
More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().