Patent Licensing in a Leadership Structure

Tarun Kabiraj

Manchester School, 2004, vol. 72, issue 2, 188-205

Abstract: The question of an optimal licensing contract in a leadership structure is studied when the patent holder is a non‐producer and has three alternative licensing strategies, namely fixed fee, royalty and auction. Assuming once‐for‐all licensing contracts we show that royalty dominates other modes when the innovation is small. For larger innovations, while fee dominates royalty, auction is the equilibrium decision. In our analysis the identity of the licensee, whether a leader or a follower, is important. We also discuss the problem when there is a threat of offering a second licensing contract.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00388.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:72:y:2004:i:2:p:188-205

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().