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LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL

Luigi Filippini ()

Manchester School, 2005, vol. 73, issue 5, 582-598

Abstract: We study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator (patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. We show that (i) the patentee's profit‐maximizing licensing contract is a royalty; (ii) the optimal royalty rate is greater than the cost reduction attained by the licensed technology and is increasing in the number of competitors; (iii) optimal licensing maximizes the likelihood of technology transfer, may reduce social welfare and always makes consumers worse off; and (iv) the innovator benefits from capacity commitment, and the more competitive the output market, the greater the gains it makes by licensing. The opposite holds for consumers.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00465.x

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