BERTRAND GAMES WITH LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AS A STRATEGIC COMMITMENT*

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Manchester School, 2006, vol. 74, issue 5, 549-557

Abstract: This paper considers lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment and discusses the respective equilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a price‐setting game with substitute goods and a price‐setting game with complementary goods. As a result, it is shown that in each case, the equilibrium coincides with the Bertrand solution with no lifetime employment.

Date: 2006
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