THE DISTURBANCE MODEL AND CONGESTION IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE*

Erwin Blackstone, Andrew Buck (), Simon Hakim () and Uriel Spiegel

Manchester School, 2007, vol. 75, issue 1, 104-121

Abstract: Public security agency response to a call for emergency service is a commons good. As consumers demand more of the commons good there is increased congestion. Police services as a commons good are modeled using the uncertainty about which calls for service are bona fide. The results are that optimal alarm systems per officer rise with the officers' wage, fall with the value of avoided losses and rise with the productivity of officers. Ceteris paribus, avoided losses are greater in the community with more alarm systems. Homogeneity of the community increases the optimal number of alarms per officer. Fining ‘well‐behaved’ alarm owners more heavily increases police productivity.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01005.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:75:y:2007:i:1:p:104-121

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