MARKET NICHE, FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT*

Suren Basov, Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait ()

Manchester School, 2007, vol. 75, issue 1, 122-130

Abstract: We study a market‐entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly). If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies favors the less flexible firms.

Date: 2007
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