GOVERNANCE‐BASED ACQUISITIONS AND RISK TAKING IN BANKING*

Víctor E. Barrios and Luis M. Granero

Manchester School, 2008, vol. 76, issue 4, 369-390

Abstract: We examine the market for corporate control in banking when strategic acquisitions are driven by the different governance structures of commercial and savings banks. In contrast to profit‐maximizing entities, we show that savings institutions can have acquisition incentives from their peculiar governance and ownership structure. Governance‐based acquisition incentives, which interact with the specifics of the loan market in affecting bank risk taking, can arise when acquisitions take place sequentially or simultaneously, and also when financial intermediaries affect risk taking directly through the target return of investments or indirectly through the loan interest rate.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.01065.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:76:y:2008:i:4:p:369-390

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().