BERTRAND COMPETITION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY MARKET*

Yasuo Sanjo

Manchester School, 2009, vol. 77, issue 3, 373-397

Abstract: We present a simple Bertrand competition model with a Hotelling (Economic Journal, Vol. 39 (1929), pp. 41–57) type spatial competition by incorporating the framework of partial privatization developed by Bös (Privatization: A Theoretical Treatment, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991). We investigate simultaneous price choice and sequential price choice with respect to fixed locations of firms and show how the degree of privatization of a public firm influences social welfare in a mixed duopoly market. We also analyse sequential price competition with respect to the location choice of firms.

Date: 2009
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