 Reflections on welfare and political economy aspects of a central bank digital currencyManchester School, 2020, vol. 88, issue S1, 114-125 Abstract: The point of departure of this short paper is that, in order to preserve the effectiveness of monetary policy in a world increasingly flooded by private digital currencies, central banks (CBs) will eventually have to issue their own digital currencies. The paper presents two proposals for the implementation of such a currency: A moderate proposal in which only the banking sector continues to have access to deposits at the CB and a radical one in which the entire private sector is allowed to hold digital currency deposits at the CB. The paper contrasts the implications of those two polar paths to a CBDC for the funding of banks, the allocation of credit to the economy, for welfare and for political feasibility. One section of the paper shows that the radical implementation may pave the way toward a narrow banking system and dramatically reduce the need for deposit insurance in the long run. The paper evaluates the relative merits of issuing a currency on a blockchain using a permissionless distributed ledger technology in comparison to a centralized (permissioned) blockchain ledger operated by the CB and concludes that the latter dominates the former in more than one dimension. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:88:y:2020:i:s1:p:114-125 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC. |
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